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MAJOR VIOLATIONS FOR THE NCAA: HOW 
THE NCAA CAN APPLY THE DODD-FRANK 
ACT TO REFORM ITS OWN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE SCHEME 
JASON P. RUDDERMAN 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 sent the United States and the global 
economy into the worst recession in eighty years.1  Large, interconnected 
financial2 and non-financial institutions were at the center of the financial 
crisis.  As a result, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),3 the “most sweeping changes to 
the financial system since the New Deal.”4  The effect or non-effect of the 
Dodd-Frank Act has been extensively analyzed for the role that it will play in 
reshaping the United States’ financial institutions and reforming corporate 
governance within businesses in the United States.5 
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1.  See Nestor M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1607, 1607 (2010); see also Kevin T. Jackson, The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a 
View from a Moral-Cultural Mental Model, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 741 (2010); Karl S. 
Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 185 (2009–
2010).  See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-
Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151 
(2011). 
2.  See Jerome A. Madden, A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strikes: Credit Default Swaps Bring 
Down AIG and Lehman Brothers, 5 BUS L. BRIEF (2008) (describing the financial condition of AIG, 
Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns and their effect on counterparties before and during the financial 
crisis). 
3.  See generally Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
4.  Jennifer Liberto, Wall Street Reform Ready for Final Votes, CNN MONEY (June 25, 2010), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/25/news/economy/Wall_Street_Reform/index.htm. 
5.  See generally, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
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This Article, however, applies the Dodd-Frank Act, and specifically its 
corporate governance laws, to the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA).6  The NCAA has experienced rapid, largely uncontrolled growth 
over the past decade7 that has led to an influx of corporate governance and 
regulatory problems within its member institutions.8  Since 2004, the median 
total revenue for Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) schools has increased from 
$28.21 million to $48.30 million.9  The largest NCAA athletic institutions 
drove the vast majority of that growth, and the gap in revenue between the 
richest and the poorest member institutions is widening.10  As with financial 
institutions, the influx of money itself is not the inherent problem.  Money in 
college athletics is good.  When large schools succeed, they help support 
smaller schools in their conference through revenue sharing plans.11  It is the 
lack of control and governance mechanisms regulating the influx of money 
that poses the risk.  Money flowing from the public to athletic associations or 
NCAA member institutions helps drive the NCAA.  But, when money flows 
from the public, or even from institutions, to student-athletes in an 
impermissible manner,12 the NCAA slips toward the kind of professionalism 
that will ultimately cause severe damage to the member institutions and the 
 
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011); Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance 
Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309 (2011); Gordon & Muller, supra note 1; Frank A. 
Mayer, III, Pricing Risk: Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act Orderly Liquidation Authority, PEPPER 
HAMILTON LLP (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_update.aspx?ArticleKey=1 
980. 
6.  See generally, David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, The NCAA Adopts “Dodd-Frank”: A Fable, 
STANFORD GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS. CLOSER LOOK SERIES: TOPICS, ISSUES & CONTROVERSIES IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NO. CGRP-20 (2011).  
7.  See generally NCAA, Revenues and Expenses 2004–2010 (2011), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4237-2004-2010-revenues-and-expenses.aspx. 
8.  See Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where it Belongs, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 551, 551 (2011) (arguing that the NCAA’s sanctions reach is overly limited, in that “they extend 
only to member institutions, not to individual coaches, players, agents, boosters, or other involved 
individuals.  The sanctions are [also too] broad in that they negatively impact current student-athletes, 
who are restricted in their ability to transfer without penalty.”)  The article proposes holding head 
coaches financially accountable for program violations, forcing member institutions to disgorge 
winnings and suffer financial consequences, and forcing the NCAA to cooperate with professional 
leagues on player-agent issues). 
9.  NCAA, supra note 7, at 17. 
10.  Christopher Schnaars et al., USA Today Sports’ College Athletics Finances, USA TODAY, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-05-14/ncaa-college-athletics-finances-data 
base/54955804/1 (last updated May 16, 2012). 
11. Associated Press, Big 12 Schools Approve Revenue Share, NCAA (Oct. 3, 2011), 
http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2011-10-03/big-12-schools-approve-revenue-share. 
12.  See 2011–12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL §§ 12.01–12.6, 14.01–14.12 [hereinafter NCAA 
BYLAWS]. 
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NCAA as a whole.13 
As more money flows into the NCAA, its member institutions, and its 
corporate leaders, new opportunities for exploitation and profits arise.  Over 
the past few years, the NCAA has struggled as agents and boosters began to 
play an increasingly significant but undesirable role in the athletic programs of 
NCAA member institutions.  Cheating amongst players, coaches, and 
administrators is rampant.14  The NCAA, like the financial industry, is 
experiencing a period of rapid growth, inconsistent (or a total lack of) 
enforceable regulation, and a tremendous influx of “foreign” variables into its 
system.  Much like the structured finance mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) 
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that eventually brought down the 
financial system in the United States, the influx of agents, booster control, and 
extreme profits within NCAA member institutions threatens the amateur status 
and ultimate viability of the NCAA and its member institutions. 
The NCAA is also experiencing a moral hazard problem.  In the financial 
sector, the idea of government bailouts creates moral hazard problems by 
effectively insuring large financial institutions.15  “[T]he notion of ‘too big to 
fail’ creates a race to the bottom, whereby institutions attempt to grow faster 
than regulators can regulate in order to force themselves into the category of 
‘too big to fail’ to implicate the inherent [sic] insurance scheme.”16  The 
NCAA is experiencing a similar phenomenon, as the largest institutions 
understand that they bring significant value to the NCAA and that the NCAA 
will be hesitant to levy harsh penalties with severe financial consequences on 
large institutions because of the consequences such penalties would have on 
the rest of the NCAA.17 
The NCAA, however, has the opportunity to avoid the fate of the financial 
industry by adopting modified provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act to reform 
corporate governance both within NCAA corporate headquarters and member 
institutions.  More stringent regulation of coaches, boosters, and agents; 
 
13.  See Philip D. Bartz & Nicholas S. Sloey, The Joy of College Sports: Why the NCAA’s 
Efforts to Preserve Amateurism Are Both Lawful and in the Best Interest of College Athletics, BRYAN 
CAVE BULLS., at 2 (Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://www.bryancave.com/files/Publication/d1b731c 
5-7f86-4347-a032-64b2049dae12/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1ee1ad19-d6cb-4ce4-8f02-66a 
e12ce1c6b/The%20Joy%20of%20College%20Sports%20-%20Article_v2.pdf. 
14.  See id. at 1. 
15.  Jason Rudderman, Eliminating Wall Street’s Safety Net: How a Systemic Risk Premium 
Can Solve “Too Big to Fail”, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 39, 53 (2012). 
16.  Id. 
17. See Michael Rosenberg, Why NCAA Couldn’t, and Wouldn’t, Give Miami the Death 
Penalty, SI.COM (Aug. 18, 2011), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/michael_rosenberg/08/ 
18/miami.deathpenalty/index.html. 
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harsher penalties for violation of those regulations; and consistent enforcement 
of such penalties will help curb the impermissible behavior of the NCAA’s 
member institutions.18 
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the goals of the NCAA and 
identifies the harms being imposed as a result of the current regulatory regime.  
Part III of this Article explores the similar market trajectories of the United 
States financial sector and the NCAA.  Part IV highlights the need for 
corporate governance reform.  Part V explores how many of the corporate 
governance reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act can solve the problems in NCAA 
corporate governance.  The purpose of Part V is not to explore the many 
arguable flaws in the Dodd-Frank Act as it applies to governance in the 
financial sector, but to explore its novel application to solving the much less 
complicated, but equally present, corporate governance issues in collegiate 
athletics.  Part VI concludes. 
II.  WHY THE LACK OF WORKABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
PUNISHMENT MECHANISMS HARMS STUDENT-ATHLETES, UNIVERSITIES, AND 
THE NCAA AS A WHOLE 
NCAA president Mark Emmert says that the NCAA should remain an 
institution focused on bettering the academic experience of student-athletes 
through collegiate athletics, and not on acting as a conduit for professional 
athletics, or as a professional athletic institution.19  The dangerous trek 
towards professionalism, de-amateurization, and corporate governance chaos 
could produce widespread harm for students, universities, and the ultimate 
consumer.  As Bartz and Sloey discuss, “[t]urning college sports into a pure 
business—as the critics effectively urge—will not fix the problems” of 
 
18.  See Jon Saraceno, NFL’s Big Hit: Saints Lose Their Head Coach, Draft Picks and Much 
More, USA TODAY, Mar. 22, 2012, at 1A (noting that as a result of the Saint’s illegal bounty program 
designed to injure opposing players, the National Football League (NFL) levied the harshest penalty 
in league history by, among other actions, suspending the head coach for one year.)  The NFL clearly 
sent a signal to the rest of the league that this kind of behavior will not be tolerated and that no team is 
above the law of the league.  The NCAA could benefit from sending a similar signal, when the time 
arises. 
19.  Office of the President: On the Mark, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
public/NCAA/NCAA+President/On+the+Mark (last updated Oct. 5, 2010).  On the collegiate model 
of athletics, President Emmert, referring to the NCAA as a whole, said that: 
We must be student-centered in all that we do.  The Association was founded on the 
notion of integrating athletics into the educational experience, and we have to make sure 
we deliver on that 100-year-old promise.  We have to remind ourselves that this is about 
the young men and women we asked to come to our schools for a great educational 
experience.  
Id. 
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scandals and rule violations in college sports.20  Certain restrictions on 
eligibility requirements are necessary to preserve the unique product of college 
sports.21 
The NCAA must continue to enforce its bylaws and regulations in order to 
preserve the uniqueness of its product.  The NCAA’s academic standards, for 
example, are a mechanism for the NCAA to prevent member institutions from 
competing for recruits on the basis of decreased academic requirements.22  
Similarly, the NCAA’s amateurism requirements that restrict pay and other 
benefits to college athletes are also necessary to preserve the product.23  
Eliminating these requirements “would almost certainly negatively impact the 
attractiveness of college [sports].”24 
Professionalizing college sports would make a select few institutions 
better off but would harm the vast majority of schools.25  While most schools 
operate football and basketball at a profit, when combined with the non-
revenue generating men’s and women’s sports, only twenty-two NCAA 
member institutions made a profit in 2010.26  A lack of regulation and 
consistency in governance by the NCAA, at the margin, will effectively 
eliminate most college athletic programs.27  The biggest, most profitable 
athletic programs will survive simply because they have the resources to entice 
athletes to attend their institutions.28  If an NCAA consisting of 120 Division I 
member institutions is more desirable than one of 10 to 15, then it is necessary 
to enforce consistent, accountable regulation and governance upon the NCAA. 
Free market proponents will argue that if market forces dictate the 
elimination of athletic programs at most NCAA institutions, then the market 
should be allowed to dictate the structure of the NCAA and pay student-
athletes, by way of a salary above and beyond the value of their scholarship, 
for their services.  But, remember that the goal of the NCAA should not be 
profit maximization—it should be fostering the advancement of academics at 
 
20.  Bartz & Sloey, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that allowing professionalism into college sports 
would actually harm the NCAA and its member institutions). 
21.  See id. at 16–17 (discussing that the “unique quality of the athletes is that they are college 
students who are also amateurs.  Those unique qualities are what make NCAA sports so popular.”). 
22.  See id. at 17–18. 
23.  See id. at 19. 
24.  Id. 
25.  See id. at 24–25. 
26.  Libby Sander, 22 Elite College Sports Programs Turned a Profit in 2010, but Gaps 
Remain, NCAA Reports Says, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 15, 2011), 
http://chronicle.com/article/22-Elite-College-Sports/127921/. 
27.  See Bartz & Sloey, supra note 13, at 24–29. 
28.  See id. at 24. 
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the highest level through athletics. 
The NCAA and its member institutions, much like the country’s largest 
financial institutions, are quickly losing sight of long-term objectives in 
exchange for short-term profits.29  For example, the head basketball coach at 
the University of Kentucky received $350,000 for winning the national title 
this year but had just $50,000 in incentives tied to the graduation rate for his 
players.30  There is an inherent problem in the fact that member institutions 
sanction such bonus structures but provide no real economic or moral 
incentive for a coach to invest in his or her student-athletes’ chances at 
graduation. 
Over the past decade, the NCAA has slowly shifted from a focus on 
amateurism and bettering the educational experience of the student-athlete31 to 
focusing on commercialism and profiting from collegiate sports.32  It is 
imperative that the NCAA adopt and enforce new regulations to rectify its 
corporate governance issues and return the NCAA to a forum for healthy 
amateur competition. 
III.  THE SIMILAR MARKET TRAJECTORIES OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL SECTOR 
AND THE NCAA 
A.  The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Financial Sector 
The financial crisis began with a decade of a capital influx into the United 
States.33  The newfound capital made raising and borrowing money easy and 
decreased rates on safe investments such as T-bills, leading to a decline in 
long-term interest rates.34  The easy money led financial institutions to become 
 
29.  See generally Associated Press, Final Four Coaches Collect Bonuses, ESPN (Mar. 27, 
2012), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/2012/story/_/id/7744519/final-four-
coaches-john-calipari-thad-matta-rick-pitino-bill-self-poised-keep-cashing-in. 
30.  Id. 
31. See Where Does the Money Go?: Eye on the Money, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ 
wcm/connect/public/ncaa/answers/eye+on+the+money (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (stating that the 
NCAA’s core purpose is “to govern competition in a fair, safe, equitable and sportsmanlike manner 
and to integrate intercollegiate athletics into higher education so that the educational experience of the 
student-athlete is paramount”). 
32.  See Michael J. Critelli, The Good, Bad and Ugly About the Commercialization of Amateur 
Sports, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-j-
critelli/amateur-sports_b_844686.html. 
33.  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman. Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Morehouse College: Four 
Questions About the Financial Crisis (Apr. 14, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090414a.htm). 
34.  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Bundesbank Lecture, Berlin, 
Germany: Global Imbalances: Recent Developments and Prospects (Sept. 11, 2007) (transcript 
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highly leveraged,35 using hard-to-value assets like CDOs and MBSs as 
collateral for loans.36 
Meanwhile, Wall Street investors noticed a consistent housing price 
increase from 1997 through 2005, and investors, borrowers, and lenders 
viewed real estate as the one investment that could never decline in value.37  
Wall Street viewed securitizing subprime loans as a way to diversify risk.38  
Investment banks purchased mortgages from a variety of originators and 
downstream bankers.39  The investment banks bought thousands of these 
mortgages and pooled them together based on factors like the creditworthiness 
of the borrower and the loan-to-value ratio of the home.40  Once the mortgages 
were pooled together based on these factors, the large pool of similar 
mortgages was split up into thousands of little slices and sold to investors as 
MBSs.41  The slice gives the investor the right to his or her fair share of the 
payment stream from the larger pool of mortgages.42  These assets, however, 
were built on the assumption that housing markets would never decline.43 
When the housing market collapsed, these assets became almost 
impossible to value.44  As foreclosed homes went up for sale by the thousands, 
neighboring homes also lost value because potential buyers were wary of 
 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070911a.htm). 
35.  See Roger Lowenstein, Smart Banks with Dumb Customers Don’t Exist, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 7, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-03-07/smart-banks-with-dumb-customers-
don-t-exist-roger-lowenstein.html  (arguing that “there is no such thing as a smart bank with a dumb 
customer; if the loan turns sour, the banker was dumb, too.”); MARIO ONORATO & GABRIELLA 
SYMEONIDOU, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: BUSINESS 
MODEL IMPLICATIONS 18 (2011) (noting that “leverage allows a financial institution to increase the 
potential gains or losses on a[n] . . . investment beyond what would be possible . . . [with its] own 
funds.”); see also, Satyajit Chatterjee, De-Leveraging and the Financial Accelerator: How Wall 
Street Can Shock Main Street, PHILA. FED. BUS. REV., Summer 2010, at 1, 2. 
36.  See Bengt Holmstrom, Discussion of “the Panic of 2007,” by Gary Gorton, MIT 
ECONOMICS (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/3784 (book review) (noting 
that as the subprime market began to collapse, the MBSs and CDOs became unable to serve as 
collateral for loans). 
37.  See World News with Charles Gibson: Housing Troubles; Boom or Bust (ABC television 
broadcast Apr. 8, 2008) (transcript on file with law review). 
38.  See Gretchen Morgenson, Housing Policy’s Third Rail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 8, 2010, at BU1. 
39.  James Kwak, Financial Crisis for Beginners, THE BASELINE SCENARIO, 
http://baselinescenario.com/financial-crisis-for-beginners/#securitization (last visited Oct. 25, 2012). 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. 
43.  See id. 
44.  Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, 2 ECON. 
LETTER: INSIGHTS FROM THE FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., Nov. 2007, at 1, 3–4. 
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buying a home in a neighborhood with lots of other foreclosures.45  Without 
home price appreciation, the homeowners who entered into complex 
adjustable mortgages during the housing boom found themselves underwater 
on their mortgages.46  Investment bankers who leveraged millions of dollars to 
purchase mortgages were stuck with homes or payment rights they could no 
longer sell.  The damaged housing market led to frozen credit markets, as 
financial institutions were left holding billions of dollars of worthless 
mortgages.47 
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy while 
holding billions of dollars worth of MBSs and caused widespread investor and 
market panic.48 
B.  The Similar Rise of the NCAA 
While a lack of corporate governance in the NCAA does not carry the 
same systemic threat as the financial markets discussed above, a total failure 
of the NCAA and, as a result, professional sports, would have large-scale 
consequences on the United States’ economy.49   The revenue numbers in the 
NCAA since 2004 are staggering.50  Median total revenue of NCAA 
institutions has increased by over 71% during the six years from 2004 to 
2010.51  By comparison, for the seven years prior to the peak of the housing 
bubble in early 2007, the average home price in the United States increased by 
approximately 36.8%.52 
Much like the United States economy, the financial gap between the 
richest and poorest NCAA member institutions is increasing.53  The 
University of Texas, the NCAA’s highest revenue generator, earned 
 
45.  Id. at 5. 
46.  Id. 
47. Bernanke, supra note 33. 
48.  Jenny Anderson & Eric Dash, For Lehman, More Cuts and Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 
2008, at C1 (noting that Lehman Brothers incurred losses of $2.8 billion during the second quarter of 
2008).  
49. See Chris Isidore, College Football’s $1.1 Billion Profit, CNN MONEY (Dec. 29, 2010), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/12/29/news/companies/college_football_dollars/index.htm (noting that 
NCAA football profits topped $1 billion dollars in 2010). 
50.  See NCAA, supra note 7, at 17. 
51.  See id. 
52.  Reggie Middleton, The Global Housing Bubble: It’s a Small World After All, SEEKING 
ALPHA (Mar. 5, 2009), http://seekingalpha.com/article/124306-the-global-housing-bubble-it-s-a-
small-world-after-all. 
53.  See Schnaars, supra note 10. 
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$150,295,926 from 2006 to 2011.54  By contrast, the University of North 
Texas, the lowest revenue generator of the 120 NCAA FBS teams, generated 
just $11,259,222.55  The University of Alabama’s athletic department had the 
highest profit in 2010 ($31,684,872), while 72 of the 120 other Division I 
athletic departments failed to return a profit.56  Meanwhile, the cost of tuition 
is rising across the board and, even for full scholarship athletes, attending 
college is becoming an expensive proposition.57  The market trajectories of the 
United States economy from 2000 to 2007 and the NCAA from 2004 to 
present are eerily similar.  Both experienced an enormous increase in revenue 
and capital influx and struggled to create meaningful, workable, and consistent 
regulatory regimes to control and manage the growth.  Without meaningful 
corporate governance reform, the NCAA is bound to collapse as schools are 
driven toward competing for athletes, not fans, in a market driven by player 
compensation, rather than by academic and athletic opportunity.58 
IV.  THE CASE FOR REFORM OF THE NCAA RULEBOOK AND COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL 
The NCAA Constitution states that the NCAA’s purpose “is to maintain 
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the 
athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear 
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports.”59  However, there has been widespread criticism of the NCAA and its 
regulatory framework for “[not] paying student athletes, limiting pay for 
coaches, measuring academic eligibility requirements in the form of 
standardized testing and high school curriculum, and using amateurism as a 
guise for commercialism in college sports.”60  The tilt towards a commercial 
focus for the NCAA has also permeated the NCAA’s member institutions and 
promoted a win at all costs mentality.  Among the NCAA schools that have 
 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Alicia Jessop, Highest Net Income Amongst Athletic Departments, THE BUS. OF COLL. 
SPORTS (Mar. 21, 2012), http://businessofcollegesports.com/2012/03/21/highest-net-income-
amongst-athletics-departments/ (noting that, like much of the financial sector prior to the collapse, the 
rich are getting richer in college football). 
57.  NCPA Scholarship Shortfall Search: NCAA Forces College Athletes to Pay, NAT’L. 
COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N., http://www.ncpanow.org/research?id=0018 (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) 
(noting that the out-of-pocket cost to a full scholarship college athlete can range from $200 to 
$10,962 per year). 
58.  Bartz & Sloey, supra note 13, at 17–18. 
59.  NCAA BYLAWS § 1.3.1 (2011–12). 
60.  Weston, supra note 8, at 562. 
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won a football national championship since 1936, all but Brigham Young 
University have had a major violation in football.61  A major violation is 
defined as one that ‘“usually provide[s] an extensive recruiting or competitive 
advantage’ that ‘can lead to significant penalties against the school and 
involved individuals.’”62 Almost half of the Division I NCAA member 
institutions have had a major violation in football since 1987, and over 80% of 
those are from the so-called Bowl Championship Series (BCS) conferences.63  
Since 1987, the Southeastern Conference has won ten national titles in 
football, more than any other conference.64  During that same timeframe, the 
Southeastern Conference had thirteen major football violations, also more than 
any other conference.65  The numbers raise the question: Is it possible to win 
in college football without cheating, and if not, why has the NCAA not made 
it impossible to win again after cheating?  The ‘“social acceptance of cheating 
has gotten ridiculous . . . .  [It is] only a problem if you get caught.  There does 
not seem to be the moral shame that there once was.’”66 
One of the main problems with corporate governance inside financial 
institutions, and the promulgated regulations outside the organizations, is the 
one-time reputational game many managers were playing.  For example, a 
manager has two options: behave honestly, truthfully, and ethically or behave 
in a self-interested, profit-maximizing manner.  Where these options are 
aligned, and the honest, truthful, ethical behavior is also the profit-maximizing 
behavior, then many problems of corporate governance disappear.  Where, 
however, as was the case in the financial sector, the profit maximizing 
behavior is not the honest, truthful, ethical, and fair behavior, managers begin 
to play a different game.  Now, managers begin by asking: Why am I pursuing 
 
61.  See Dennis Dodd, Championships Without Cheating? History is Against it, CBS 
SPORTS.COM (July 6, 2011), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/15298370/championsh 
ips-without-cheating-maybe-doable-but-history-against-it (noting that even the schools without major 
violations “aren’t necessarily crowing over that fact, more like crossing their fingers”). 
62.  Brett McMurphy, Major NCAA Violations Yield Relatively Minor Consequences, CBS 
SPORTS.COM (July 11, 2011), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/15312728/major-ncaa-
violations-yield-relatively-minor-consequences (quoting Glossary of Terms, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Enforcement/Resources/Glossary (last updated 
Mar. 21, 2011)).  Major violations include repeated impermissible contact with recruits and delivering 
impermissible benefits to players. 
63.  See Dodd, supra note 61. 
64.  See Past FBS Champions, CBS SPORTS.COM,  http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball 
/story/2554072 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). 
65.  Brett McMurphy, Infractions Scoreboard: Nearly Everybody Gets in on the Fun, CBS 
SPORTS.COM (July 8, 2011), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/15304779/infractions-
scoreboard-nearly-everybody-gets-in-on-the-fun.  
66.  See Dodd, supra note 61 (quoting Marc Ganis, president of SportsCorp). 
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the course or career I am pursuing?  Is it for personal fulfillment or financial 
gain?  Again, where it is for personal fulfillment, the inquiry stops and the 
manager likely behaves ethically.  Where it is for financial gain, the inquiry 
continues.  Now, the manager asks a final question: Do the financial rewards I 
can gain from behaving unethically outweigh the reputational hit I will take as 
a result of this behavior?  If the costs to the manager’s reputation outweigh the 
financial reward, the inquiry ends again, and the manager behaves ethically.  
Where the financial gain outweighs the reputational hit to the manager, the 
manager behaves unethically. 
From a coaching and player perspective, the inquiry is much the same.  
The coach, for example, asks whether he should behave in the honest, ethical, 
rule-abiding manner or in the “win” maximizing manner.67  Where those two 
outcomes are the same, the inquiry ends.  Where they differ, the coach asks: 
Why am I pursuing the course I am pursuing?  If it is because of the ultimate 
desire to win at all costs, the coach cheats.  If it is because the coach wants to 
be a role model for the young men and women he mentors, then he behaves 
ethically and the inquiry ends.  If the coach decides he wants to win at all 
costs, the coach asks: Do the prospective gains from cheating outweigh the 
costs to my reputation if I am caught?  Where the gains outweigh the costs, the 
coach cheats.68 
 
67.  Evidence of this behavior is derived from the coaches who knowingly take action that 
violates a NCAA rule in order to try to gain a competitive advantage on the field.  See Associated 
Press, Arizona St. Postseason Ban Upheld, ESPN (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/story/_/id/7189349/ncaa-upholds-postseason-ban-arizona-state-sun-devils-
baseball (discussing a postseason ban and vacation of wins for the Arizona State baseball team after it 
was found the head coach failed to promote an atmosphere of compliance and committed a number of 
recruiting violations) (hereinafter Arizona St. Postseason Ban Upheld); Associated Press, NCAA Puts 
Radford on 2-Year Probation, ESPN (Feb. 24, 2012), http://espn.go.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/7612521/ncaa-punishes-radford-highlanders-sanctions-brad-greenberg (hereinafter 
NCAA Puts Radford on 2-Year Probation) (stating that Radford basketball coaches provided 
impermissible transportation and lodging benefits to recruits); Boise State Cited for Major Violations, 
NCAA (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2011-09-13/boise-state-cited-major-
violations (noting that Boise State, in addition to multiple recruiting violations, provided 
impermissible lodging, transportation, practice sessions, financial aid, and cash payments to players 
and recruits); Bruce Pearl Told Recruits of Violation, ESPN (Oct. 22, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=5714649 (stating that Bruce Pearl, the former men’s 
basketball coach at Tennessee, hosted a BBQ for recruits at his home and told the recruits and their 
families that “their visit equated to an NCAA violation”); NCAA Accepts Baylor’s Penalties, ESPN 
(Apr. 12, 2012), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7801565/ncaa-puts-baylor-bears-
probation-accepts-self-imposed-penalties-text-messages (noting that Baylor was placed on three 
years’ probation after coaches made hundreds of impermissible phone calls and text messages to 
recruits). 
68.  In all the above scenarios, it is safe to say that coaches committed these recruiting 
violations because they believed that the gains to be had from signing a key recruit outweighed the 
risk of the violation.  See generally Arizona St. Postseason Ban Upheld, supra note 67; NCAA Puts 
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In the financial sector, when a manager decides to pursue financial gain at 
the expense of a reputational hit, the violation is often incredibly damaging 
and the consequences are made exceedingly public.69  However, the golden 
parachutes present in many executive compensation packages are often so 
substantial that any public hit to reputation, if there is one, is minimal in 
comparison.70  In college athletics, however, the financial reward from 
cheating is substantially greater than the cost to a coach’s, player’s, or 
administrator’s reputation because of the lack of consistently enforceable 
punishment mechanisms in the NCAA.71  NCAA President Mark Emmert 
acknowledged the reputational problem and recently proposed revised 
punishment guidelines for NCAA member institutions to deal with the issue.72  
Emmert emphasized the need for ‘“some sort of constructive fear’” in NCAA 
member institutions.73  The NCAA’s Vice President for Enforcement also 
remarked that the NCAA needs a fair penalty structure but also one that is 
strong and predictable.74  Member institutions acknowledge that scholarship 
reductions, postseason bans, and coaching suspensions have the greatest 
deterrence effect and do the most to eliminate the advantages gained from an 
infraction.75  However, the NCAA has been more apt in recent years to shy 
away from using its harshest penalties.76 
Although the NCAA is taking steps to restructure its enforcement team for 
more effective regulation,77 the current ‘“reward [of cheating] outweighs the 
 
Radford on 2-Year Probation, supra note 67; Boise Stat Cited for Major Violations, supra note 67; 
Bruce Pearl Told Recruits of Violation, supra note 67; NCAA Accepts Baylor’s Penalties, supra note 
67. 
69.  See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld, The Madoff Fraud: Madoff Investors Brace for Lawsuits, 
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2010, at C1 (representing just one article as part of an entire online section 
dedicated to the Madoff scandal). 
70.  See Steven M. Davidoff, Out of the Ruins: Where Directors Landed, DEALBOOK (Aug. 2, 
2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/out-of-the-ruins-where-directors-landed/ (showing 
that oftentimes, managers take extreme risk with very little downside). 
71.  Dodd, supra note 61 (“The near-death penalty handed to USC might have been a good 
place for the NCAA to start cleaning up [their regulatory regime]. . . .  But the college world is 
waiting to see if the NCAA infractions committee is going to keep the momentum going [in future 
punishments].”). 
72.  Steve Wieberg, NCAA Proposal Would Ratchet up Penalties, USA TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-02-09/ncaas-emmert-backs-tough-enforcement-
changes/53033832/1 (last updated Feb. 12, 2012). 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. 
76.  See id. 
77.  NCAA Enforcement Restructures for Greater Flexibility, NCAA (June 30, 2011), 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/2011/june/ncaa+enforceme
nt+restructures+for+greater+flexibility. 
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risk.’”78  What fans want, and what the NCAA needs, is a more court-like 
proceeding—one where “cases . . . are processed quickly and similar penalties 
[are handed down] for similar violations.”79  The consequences for violations 
in the NCAA are so minor that Alabama and Louisiana State University (LSU) 
could still compete for the national title in 2011 even though they were both 
on probation.80  Of the seventy-two major NCAA violations handed down 
since 1987, thirty teams had a higher winning percentage for the five-year 
period after the penalties were levied than they did during the five years 
before.81  Cheating by NCAA member institutions obviously provides a long-
term benefit to its offenders.  That benefit, as evidenced by the fact that many 
teams actually win more frequently after a penalty is levied than they do prior 
to the penalty, also indicates that the consequences for cheating do little to 
eliminate the competitive advantage gained by the cheating institution. 
V.  WHERE THE NCAA STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE ALIGN WITH THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR, AND HOW THE DODD-FRANK ACT CAN HELP RESOLVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS IN THE NCAA 
With the regulatory inconsistencies and recent historical contexts in mind, 
this Article now turns to the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that deal with 
corporate governance in financial institutions and, with some modifications, 
are equally applicable to the NCAA. 
A. Too Big to Fail82 
B. Executive compensation 
a. Section 951: requiring shareholder votes on executive 
compensation.83 
b. Section 953: requiring executive compensation 
disclosure.84 
c. Section 954: requiring executives to return compensation 
 
78.  Dodd, supra note 61 (quoting David Ridpath, an NCAA compliance expert). 
79.  Id. 
80.  See generally NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, TUSCALOOSA PUBLIC INFRACTIONS 
REPORT (2009); NCAA, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT (2011). 
81.  McMurphy, supra note 62.  But note, probation is a necessary, but it is only a part of the 
story.  There are a number of variables that affect the winning percentage of programs after a major 
violation.  One reason for the increased winning percentage is the change in coaching staff that results 
after a major violation occurs.  Programs actually benefit from the violation, as they get a fresh start 
with a new coach. 
82.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, at preamble (2010). 
83.  Id. § 951. 
84.  Id. § 953. 
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in certain circumstances.85 
C. Regulatory consistency, comparability, and transparency 
a. Section 712: requiring consultation by broker dealers with 
the Commodities Futures Trade Commission (CFTC) or 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) before making a 
trade in order to assure regulator consistency, 
comparability, and transparency.86 
D. Independent committees 
a. Section 932: providing for an independent board of 
directors.87 
E. Whistleblower protections 
a. Section 1014: providing for the consumer advisory 
board.88 
A.  “Too Big to Fail” 
The opening paragraph of the Dodd-Frank Act states that the purpose of 
the Act is to “promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, 
to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers 
from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”89  Similarly, 
the opening paragraph of the NCAA Rulebook on Enforcement states, “It shall 
be the mission of the NCAA enforcement program to eliminate violations of 
NCAA rules and impose appropriate penalties should violations occur.”90 
During the financial crisis, Congress learned quickly that inconsistent 
treatment of the largest financial institutions would create significant backlash 
from the public and private sectors and create confusion in the markets.91  
 
85.  Id. § 954. 
86.  Id. § 712. 
87.  Id. § 932. 
88.  Id. § 1014. 
89.  Id. at preamble. 
90.  NCAA BYLAWS § 19.01.1 (2011–12).  The regulation continues, 
The program is committed to fairness of procedures and the timely and equitable 
resolution of infractions cases.  The achievement of these objectives is essential to the 
conduct of a viable and effective enforcement program.  Further, an important 
consideration in imposing penalties is to provide fairness to uninvolved student-athletes, 
coaches, administrators, competitors and other institutions. 
Id. 
91.  See generally Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1 
(2000). 
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Title 1 of the Dodd-Frank Act creates the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) to “monitor emerging risks to U. S. financial stability” and to 
identify and recommend for monitoring those financial and non-financial 
institutions that pose a systemic risk to the United States financial system.92  
However, knowing the regulatory framework that is in place, large institutions, 
as part of their growth plan, will consider the likely response of the 
government should the institution fail.  The institution knows that the 
government will likely find that the cost of saving a single “too big to fail” 
institution is outweighed by the cost to the overall economy should that 
institution be allowed to fail. 
Thus, in a one-time game, the institution has every incentive 
to take great risk to ensure that [the damage the institution 
would do should it fail is so great that] the government will 
[essentially have no choice but to] bail out the institution . . . .  
However, the government is involved in a longer-term game, 
and while it may be rational for the government to bail out a 
financial institution in one period, it may not be rational for 
the government to send a signal to other institutions, by way 
of a bailout, that they are able and willing to bail out a failing 
institution in a future period.93 
The NCAA has found itself wrapped up in a similar game, whereby 
institutions like Ohio State University and the University of Texas, and 
conferences like the Southeastern Conference and the Pac 12, have essentially 
been tagged “too big to fail.”  These institutions and conferences have 
positioned themselves so that their “failure,” by way of cheating, and 
equivalent severe punishment by the NCAA, would have such devastating 
effects on the school’s conference and the NCAA that levying serious 
sanctions on the school would be equivalent to allowing, as the government 
did, Lehman Brothers to fail.94   Lehman Brothers, while operating, helped 
support the United States credit market by issuing loans, receiving loans, and 
using asset-backed securities as collateral in both instances.95  By analogy, 
most major conferences have revenue sharing plans, whereby the largest, most 
profitable, “too big to fail” athletic programs in each conference help support 
 
92.  The Restoring of American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. Rep. 111-176, at 2. 
93.  Rudderman, supra note 15, at 49–50. 
94. See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of England, Speech at the Financial 
Student Association, Amsterdam: Rethinking the Financial Network 2 (Apr. 2009) (transcript 
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf).  
Haldane compares the contagion effect of the financial crisis to the SARS outbreak, highlighting the 
gross overreaction of the masses that led to the ultimate collapse of a system. 
95.  See id. 
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the lower revenue generating schools.96  As discussed, large financial 
institutions will ensure that they become so large that the government will be 
forced to bail them out to avoid a total systemic collapse of the economy.  
NCAA member institutions do not have the same tools at their disposal to 
rapidly scale their size and profitability.  Instead, and what has happened over 
recent years, the NCAA has levied lesser penalties on larger institutions for 
similar violations because of what the larger institutions mean to the 
profitability and viability of conferences and the NCAA.97  Large member 
institutions now have an incentive to “bend” the rules as much as possible 
without being subject to serious penalties (the threshold of which is much 
higher than with smaller member institutions), and in turn, the NCAA has an 
incentive to levy harsh penalties on small, low revenue generating institutions 
in an inadequate attempt to signal to NCAA member institutions that 
violations will not be tolerated.98 
As with financial institutions, however, the regulatory scheme to solve 
“too big to fail” cannot be a hands-off approach that allows every systemically 
important but struggling institution to fail.  And it cannot be a system of pure 
ex-ante regulations because the ingenuity of the financial markets, and the 
NCAA, will simply perpetuate a race to the bottom.99 
The NCAA cannot levy crippling penalties on its largest, most profitable 
schools because of the systemic impact it would have on the NCAA and its 
member institutions, nor can it regulate away all violations of NCAA rules 
through ex-ante regulations.  What the NCAA can do, however, is adopt the 
system of ex-ante regulations proposed below and develop a framework for 
punishment that is consistently decided based on the nature of the violations 
and not the size, scale, profitability, or history of the member institution. 
 
96.  Associated Press, supra note 11. 
97.  See Bill N., Auburn’s Cam Newton Got a Day and USC Trojans’ Football Got Bush-
Whacked by NCAA, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 1, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/532046-usc-
football-auburns-cam-newton-got-a-day-and-the-trojans-got-bushwhacked (noting that it makes a big 
difference playing in the SEC, as Auburn received a slap on the wrist for its potential pay-for-play 
scheme, and USC received severe punishment in a case where the NCAA had little proof of 
knowledge on the part of the institution). 
98.  Compare Rosenberg, supra note 17 (noting that Miami “means” too much to college 
football for the NCAA to levy severe penalties commensurate with the violations.  A Miami booster 
provided upwards of seventy players with cash, benefits, parties, and adult entertainment), with NCAA 
Puts Radford on 2-Year Probation, supra note 67 (discussing severe penalties for Radford’s 
basketball program resulting from relatively minor lodging and transportation violations). 
99.  Rudderman, supra note 15, at 53. 
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B.  Sections 951, 953, 954 and How These Compensatory Regulations Can Be 
Applied to Players and Coaches 
In the years leading up to the financial crisis, executive compensation 
ballooned largely out of control.  As a result, Congress enacted sections 951, 
953, and 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act.100  Section 951 provides that at least 
once every three years, executive compensation shall be subject to a 
shareholder vote.101  At least once every six years, shareholders shall vote to 
determine whether to vote on executive compensation every one, two, or three 
years.102  However, the SEC may exempt small issuers from the voting 
requirements if it “disproportionally burdens” the issuer.103 
Section 953 requires disclosure to shareholders of executive compensation 
schemes, as well as information showing “the relationship between executive 
compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the issuer, taking 
into account any change in the value of the shares of stock and dividends of 
the issuer and any distributions.”104  The section also requires that the issuer 
disclose the median of the annual total compensation of all employees of the 
issuer, except the chief executive officer.105 
Section 954 requires that: 
In the event that the issuer is required to prepare an 
accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of 
the issuer with any financial reporting requirement under the 
securities laws, the issuer will recover from any current or 
former executive officer of the issuer who received incentive-
based compensation (including stock options awarded as 
compensation) during the 3-year period preceding the date on 
which the issuer is required to prepare an accounting 
restatement, based on the erroneous data, in excess of what 
would have been paid to the executive officer under the 
accounting restatement.106 
In other words, the executive must repay the difference between what the 
executive actually received and what the executive would have received if the 
 
100.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 951, 953–54, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899, 1903–04. 
(2010) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n-1, 78l, 78j-4 (2012)). 
101.  Id. § 951(a)(1). 
102.  Id. § 951(a)(2). 
103.  Id. § 951(e). 
104.  Id. § 953(a)(i). 
105.  Id. § 953(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
106.  Id. § 954(b)(2). 
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financial statements were correctly reported.107 
These three main executive compensation provisions of Dodd-Frank can 
be implemented, in an altered form, to remedy a misalignment of incentives in 
coaches’ and directors’ salaries in collegiate athletics.108  At most large 
schools, the three highest profile “executives” are the head men’s basketball 
coach, the head football coach, and the athletic director.  They are often the 
most highly compensated members of the athletic department.109  Despite their 
high salaries and public figure status, the NCAA rulebook is relatively silent 
on coaches’ and directors’ “executive” compensation.110 
The NCAA rulebook spends just over one page discussing “executive 
compensation.”111  The NCAA imposes regulations and restrictions mostly 
aimed at prohibiting athletic association employees from accepting outside 
supplemental pay for unspecified achievements and prohibits any outside 
source from controlling the employment or compensation decisions of athletic 
association employees.112  Below are three proposed amendments that should 
be added to section 11.3 of the NCAA rulebook in order to align the incentives 
of NCAA “executives” with the goals of the NCAA and to implement more 
responsibility and accountability amongst the chief officials at member 
institutions. 
First, in assessing and applying the Dodd-Frank Act to the NCAA, it is 
necessary to think of students, faculty, boosters, alumni, student-athletes, and 
academic administrations as stakeholders of the private athletic associations 
and each individual athletic association as a stakeholder of the larger NCAA 
governing body.  In considering the abovementioned parties as stakeholders, it 
is easy to see how section 951—requiring an annual, bi-annual, or tri-annual 
vote by shareholders on executive compensation, and requiring a vote at least 
 
107.  Id. 
108.  See generally Arizona St. Postseason Ban Upheld, supra note 67; NCAA Puts Radford on 
2-Year Probation, supra note 67; Boise State Cited for Major Violations, supra note 67; Bruce Pearl 
Told Recruits of Violation, supra note 67; NCAA Accepts Baylor’s Penalties, supra note 67. 
109.  See Erik Brady et al., Coaches’ Pay Soars Again, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2011, at 1A 
(hereinafter Coaches’ Pay Soars Again) (noting that the average compensation for a NCAA head 
football coach in a conference with an automatic BCS bid is $2.15 million); Erik Brady et al., You 
Have to Pay to Play in March, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2012, at 1A (hereinafter You Have to Pay to 
Play in March) (noting the average salary for a coach in the NCAA men’s basketball tournament is 
$1.4 million); Jodi Upton & Steve Berkowitz, Athletics Directors Cashing in, too, USA TODAY, Oct. 
6, 2011, at 1A (noting that one out of every twelve athletic directors makes more than $900,000). 
110.  See NCAA BYLAWS §§ 11.2–11.3 (2011–12). 
111.  See id. 
112.  Id.  However, the NCAA rulebook’s restrictions on executive compensation make no 
mention of how compensation is determined nor the financial consequences for executives in the 
event the school is placed on probation as a result of their actions.  
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once every six years on how often to vote on executive compensation—113and 
section 953—requiring certain disclosures of executive and other employee 
salaries—114can apply to the NCAA.  Currently, NCAA member institution 
“executives” are accountable either to the athletic director, in the case of a 
head coach, or to the university president, in the case of an athletic director.  
The university system in America is unique, however, as alumni and current 
students largely power the incoming cash flow for the schools that in turn 
support athletic associations.115  The corporate governance structure of 
allowing such closely held evaluations by a few individuals to determine the 
amount of compensation of executives and the satisfactory or non-satisfactory 
nature of their performance is more akin to the present structure in a closely 
held startup company, rather than a large, even private, institution.  Allowing 
university students, faculty, boosters, alumni, student-athletes, and academic 
administrations to vote annually or bi-annually on the compensation of the top 
“executives” within its athletic department will force accountability on the part 
of the “executives” to university stakeholders and align “executives’” goals 
with the long term goals of the university and its stakeholders. 
Critics will argue that current students would not sacrifice winning now to 
remove or limit the compensation of a coach committing violations, causing 
damage to the long-term reputation of the school.  However, at schools that are 
the subject of this Article, athletics drive academics as much as academics 
drive athletics.116  Athletic success on the field drives up applications and 
institutional ranking in the two to three years following a national 
championship in football or basketball.117  Unlike financial investments, 
where shareholders have the ability to disconnect themselves with a company 
by selling stock and have every incentive to maximize value now, students and 
other stakeholders of an academic institution often make a lifelong financial 
 
113.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified as 
amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)). 
114.  Id. § 953. 
115.  See Mike Fish, Most Powerful Boosters, ESPN (Jan. 12, 2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/ 
ncf/news/story?id=2285986; Darren Rovell, The High Price of Supply and Demand, ESPN (Jan. 13, 
2006), http://proxy.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=2286027. 
116.  Drew Kann, Athletics Can Help Lessen Budget Cuts, RED AND BLACK (Mar. 4, 2010), 
http://redandblack.com/2010/03/04/athletics-can-help-lessen-budget-cuts/ (noting that the University 
of Georgia athletic department, and others around the country, donate millions of dollars to their 
institution’s academic programs each year). 
117.  Steven R. Cox & Dianne M. Roden, Quality Perception and the Championship Effect: Do 
Collegiate Sports Influence Academic Rankings?, 6 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. J. 1, 4 (2010) (finding that 
“the average college ranking . . . for the two years after winning a national championship in football 
or basketball is significantly improved compared to the two years before.  Consistent with increased 
applications, acceptance rates are lower and SAT scores are higher.”). 
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and emotional commitment to that institution.  Thus, students and boosters 
alike have a long-term incentive in maintaining the academic and athletic 
prestige of their institution.  As important as it is to win now, most college 
students also understand the role athletics plays in helping maintain the value 
of their degree. 
Second, section 954 provides a bigger stick for enforcement by the 
NCAA.  As discussed previously, major violations of NCAA rules and the 
issuance of major probations have been widespread in recent years.118  
However, instead of placing the brunt of the penalty where it belongs—on the 
supervising “executives”—the NCAA too often punishes players, coaches, and 
students who had less to do with the violation than the “executives.”119  The 
Dodd-Frank Act succeeds in assigning blame where it belongs and requiring 
repayment of fraudulently obtained compensation.120 
The actions that result in probation or major punishment in the NCAA 
usually arise at two levels within the organization, the coaching level and the 
player level.  Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act, requiring repayment of 
compensation to the institution, is most applicable at the coaching level.  The 
NCAA is prone to leveling two different kinds of penalties on coaches: a 
“show-cause”121 penalty that makes it difficult for the coach committing the 
violation to work at another institution in the NCAA and a probational penalty 
against the school and its athletic department.122  The NCAA, however, does 
not require repayment of salary or benefits by the coach to the institution, and 
probational penalties often hurt the student-athletes and students more so than 
the coach who caused the probation to be levied.123  Coaches can leave a 
probation-stricken program to coach at another institution if there is not a 
show cause penalty attached to the probation, or they can leave to coach in 
professional sports.124  By adopting a compensation provision inspired by 
 
118.  See generally Arizona St. Postseason Ban Upheld, supra note 67; NCAA Puts Radford on 
2-Year Probation, supra note 67; Boise State Cited for Major Violations, supra note 67; Bruce Pearl 
Told Recruits of Violation, supra note 67; NCAA Accepts Baylor’s Penalties, supra note 67. 
119.  Weston, supra note 8, at 564–66. 
120.  See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (codified 
as amended in 15 U.S.C. §78j-4 (2012)). 
121.  NCAA BYLAWS § 19.5.2(k) (2011–12) (requiring “that an institution that has been found 
in violation . . . of the provisions of NCAA legislation while representing another institution, show 
cause why a penalty or additional penalty should not be imposed, if, in the opinion of the Committee 
on Infractions, the institution has not taken appropriate disciplinary or corrective action against 
athletics department personnel involved in the infractions case or any other institutional employee, if 
the circumstances warrant, or a representative of the institution’s athletics interests”). 
122.  Id. § 19.5.2(b). 
123.  Weston, supra note 8, at 565–68. 
124.  See, e.g., Associated Press, Colts Hire Jim Tressel as Consultant, ESPN (Sept. 2, 2011), 
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Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the NCAA can eliminate the ability for 
coaches who incur probational penalties for their schools to escape without 
consequence.  The regulation should be similar to the Dodd-Frank Act 
provision and require an assessment of income generated by the coach, both in 
the season prior to the probation being levied and in the season after the 
probation is levied.  For example, a team like University of Southern 
California (USC), which Pete Carroll left amidst a slew of probational 
penalties, was forced to forgo a lucrative BCS bowl for two seasons as a result 
of penalties incurred under Pete Carroll’s watch.125  USC could have made 
millions of dollars simply by participating in the bowl.126  The proposed 
regulation would account for that loss, among other measurable losses as a 
direct result of probation, and determine the percentage decrease in football 
revenue as a result of the probation.  If the percentage decrease is, for 
example, 20%, then the coach responsible for the probation should be forced 
to return 20% of his salary for the year(s) in which the probation occurred for 
as long as the decrease in revenue continues.  So, in the case of a coach 
directly committing violations that result in the “death penalty”127 for the 
program, the forfeited compensation would equal 100% of the coach’s salary.  
By implementing such a scheme, the NCAA could solve one of the major 
sources of violations that lead to probation. 
The second major source of probational violations is player misconduct.128  
 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6922766/indianapolis-colts-hire-jim-tressel-replay-review-consultant 
(noting how Jim Tressel, after leaving Ohio State as a result of numerous NCAA violations and a 
subsequent cover up, obtained a job with the NFL’s Indianapolis Colts as a replay consultant); 
Seahawks Introduce New Coach Carroll, ESPN (Jan. 13, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/ 
story?id=4819493 (noting how Pete Carroll left USC in the wake of NCAA violations to pursue a 
career in the NFL where he would not be subject to whatever sanctions the NCAA placed on USC). 
125.  See NCAA Delivers Postseason Football Ban, ESPN (June 11, 2010), http://sports.espn. 
go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5272615. 
126.  See Chris Greenberg & Chris Spurlock, Bowl Game Payouts Map: Money Earned in 
2011–2012 BCS and Other Football Bowls, THE HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/12/29/bowl-game-payouts-map-2011-2012-bcs_n_1174808.html (last updated Aug. 7, 2012). 
127.   Associated Press, NCAA Prez: Death Penalty an Option, ESPN (Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/6877907/ncaa-president-mark-emmert-says-death-
penalty-option-punish-rule-breakers.  The death penalty is a potential enforcement mechanism for the 
NCAA.  When a school has had two major infractions during a five-year period, the NCAA can issue 
the “death penalty” for the sport that incurred the infractions.  Id.  The death penalty prevents the 
school from participating in the sport for one year.  Id. 
128.  See, e.g., Pete Thamel, Hurricane Players and Recruits Accused of NCAA Violations, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, at B14 (discussing former Miami booster Nevin Shapiro and his role in 
distributing thousands of dollars to Miami players and providing yachts and adult entertainment to 
players and recruits at his home); Lynn Zinser, U.S.C. Sports Receive Harsh Penalties from NCAA, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at B9 (discussing the improper benefits that basketball star O.J. Mayo and 
football star Reggie Bush accepted during their time at USC); Stewart Mandel, Tressel on Borrowed 
Time at Ohio State in Wake of NCAA Allegations, SI.COM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/ 
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The NCAA struggles in governing player misconduct in much of the same 
way that it struggles governing coaching misconduct.  Players, like coaches, 
who commit violations or are suspended from their current school can transfer 
to a lower division school and play immediately, or if they meet the 
professional eligibility requirements of their respective league, they can leave 
school.  The student-athletes, like the coaches, are currently in a one-time 
reputational game where the risk of cheating is often worth the reward, not 
because the reward is so great, but because the consequences are so minor.  In 
order to solve this asymmetry, there are two possible solutions.  The first, 
paying student-athletes, has been widely debated and criticized, and is one this 
Article will not explore.129  Since players are not paid, the compensation 
clawbacks discussed above are not a viable alternative. 
The third proposed reform, and second potential solution to solving the 
reputational game athletes play, is a partnership between the NCAA and the 
(NFL) and National Basketball Association (NBA).  The partnership can serve 
as an analog to coach’s compensation clawbacks.  This structure has begun to 
develop already, as both the NFL and NBA have implemented policies 
requiring collegiate athletes to spend a specified number of years removed 
from high school in order to be eligible for the professional draft.130  The 
requirement has had a widespread effect on players leaving college early for 
the draft, or not attending college at all, but has done little to curb violations 
amongst amateur players.  The NCAA should continue its relationship with 
the NBA and NFL and view the professional leagues as government regulators 
that will impose penalties on players who commit infractions at the college 
level.  By doing so, the NCAA will eliminate the one-time reputational game 
many players play during their college tenure and will force players and 
coaches to become repeat players in the broader game of sports, rather than 
one-time players under the NCAA’s watch. 
A player, for example, who commits a violation in his senior year, is 
forced to sit out at the Division I level or play at a community college or 
Division II level, and then enters the professional draft has no real incentive to 
 
writers/stewart_mandel/04/25/ohio-state-tressel-ncaa/index.html (last updated Apr. 26, 2011) 
(discussing the player misconduct and subsequent cover up that eventually cost Jim Tressel his job). 
129.  See, e.g., Doug Bandow, End College Sports Indentured Servitude: Pay “Student 
Athletes”, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2012/02/21/end-
college-sports-indentured-servitude-pay-student-athletes/; Ben Cohen, The Case for Paying College 
Athletes: The Issue is Gaining Momentum, but Nobody Knows How to Do It, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 
2011, at D10. 
130.  See NCAA BYLAWS § 12.2.4.2 (2011–12); see also John Infante, Draft Rules Fail Basics 
of Amateurism, NCAA (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/blog/2011/02/draft-rules-fail-basics-of-
amateurism/. 
RUDDERMAN REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2012  1:48 PM 
2012] THE NCAA AND THE DODD-FRANK ACT  125 
behave properly in college.  The end game result is still the same for a player 
who turns professional.  In order to effectively deter student-athletes from 
committing violations, the NCAA needs to enforce carryover penalties that 
follow the athletes into their professional careers. 
C.  Consistency, Comparability, and Transparency in Recruiting and Post-
Enrollment Benefits 
Financial markets struggle to create common knowledge because of the 
delicate balance between disclosing enough information to avert a disastrous 
collapse and keeping confidential enough information to ensure an institution 
retains its proprietary advantage in the marketplace.131  Too much common 
knowledge stifles innovation and eliminates some competitive advantages, 
while too little common knowledge “perpetuates risky behavior beyond an 
efficient threshold.”132  Often times, the longer the market goes without 
creating common knowledge, the higher the profits and the harder the 
collapse.133  The lack of common knowledge prevents a bubble from 
bursting.134 
A major portion of the Dodd-Frank Act is meant to create transparency 
and accountability, and in turn common knowledge, for exotic instruments 
such as asset-backed securities, hedge funds, MBSs, and payday lenders.135  It 
is well discussed that the depth and breadth of asymmetric information 
regarding the abovementioned exotic instruments contributed greatly to the 
financial crisis.136  Issuers, purchases, and unsophisticated consumers allowed 
the cash flows from these exotic instruments to dictate their price and demand 
without conducting much, if any, due diligence into the underlying assets.137  
By the time the credit markets froze, these exotic instruments were so far 
 
131.  Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic 26–27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper 
14398, 2008). 
132.  Rudderman, supra note 15, at 68. 
133.  Id. 
134.  See Robert J. Aumann, Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality, 8 
Games & Econ. Behav. 6, 6 (1995) (arguing “that if common knowledge of rationality obtains in a 
game of perfect information, then the backward induction outcome is reached”). 
135.  See generally U.S. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSE, & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY 
OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_s
ummary_Final.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
136.  Michel G. Maila, Contributing Factors to the Emergence of Risk in Financial Markets 
and Implications for Risk Governance, INT’L. RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 1, 1–2 (Oct. 2010) 
(noting that the prevalence of sophisticated financial products creates a large information gap). 
137.  Rudderman, supra note 15, at 57–58. 
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removed from their original source or issuer that institutions and counter 
parties were unable to determine how risky their investments actually were.138 
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act charges the CFTC and the SEC with 
consulting each other and the prudential regulators to ensure that any 
rulemaking or orders regarding the abovementioned exotic instruments are 
coordinated to assure “consistency and comparability.”139  The title also 
requires that the CFTC and SEC address one of the main regulatory problems 
in any scheme, regulating function over form.140  The title also gives the 
FSOC ultimate discretion over resolving disputes between the CFTC and SEC 
and addressing unaddressed regulatory issues.141  The regulatory scheme gives 
broad discretionary authority to the CFTC, SEC and ultimately, FSOC to (1) 
use their regulatory and investigatory power to create common knowledge and 
develop transparency and accountability and (2) to regulate function over form 
in securities and swaps markets.142 
Businesses, financial markets, and even the NCAA are like fragile 
ecosystems.143  When a market, or ecosystem, consists of similar individual 
pieces, “one shared weakness can spell disaster for the whole lot.  Even when 
a new beneficial trait or tool enters the picture, if all organisms adopt it . . . a 
tenuous balance can be quickly upset . . . .”144  “Like the spread of an 
infectious disease, financial troubles can be launched by so-called ‘super-
spreaders,’” or what we would deem “too big to fail” institutions.145  The 
financial markets saw the introduction of a new, foreign, but beneficial 
product, quickly adopted it in mass numbers, and then, because of the 
homogeneity of the market, collapsed after a minor blip on the radar. 
One can think of the NCAA as an ecosystem with agents, boosters, and 
incredible sums of money as foreign, but perhaps beneficial objects, and 
 
138.  Id. (noting that the costs of conducting due diligence far outweigh the risks for a repeat 
player.  The cycle also increases the adverse selection problem as counter parties know that the 
institution holding the asset does not know exactly what it is, and moral hazard is exacerbated as the 
exotic instruments are passed so quickly that no one party has any incentive to conduct adequate due 
diligence.). 
139.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712(a)(1)–(2), 124 Stat.1376, 1641–42 (2010) 
(codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. 8302 (2012)). 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. § 712(a)(7)(A). 
142.  Id. § 712(a)(7)(A)–(B). 
143.  See Katherine Harmon, Can Ecological Models Explain Global Financial Markets—and 
Make Them More Stable?, SCI. AM. (Jan. 19, 2011), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/ 
2011/01/19/can-ecological-models-explain-global-financial-markets-and-make-them-more-stable/. 
144.  Id. (quoting Andrew G. Haldane & Robert M. May, Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems, 
NATURE, Jan. 20, 2011, at 351.) 
145.  Id. 
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understand how the NCAA is following the same path as the financial 
markets.  As each member institution pays its coaches and directors more 
money,146 as boosters become increasingly influential in the day-to-day 
operations of athletic institutions,147 and as agents insert their professional 
advice into amateur athletics,148 the risk of de-amateurization and the end of 
the NCAA in its current form increases.  In order to curb the “ecosystem” 
effect, the NCAA should adopt modified versions of the abovementioned 
Dodd-Frank Act provisions to increase accountability and transparency and to 
ensure consistency in enforcement and regulation.  One can view the CFTC 
and SEC as individual NCAA member institutions and conferences and the 
overall governing body of the NCAA as the prudential regulators with ultimate 
authority.  The current NCAA compliance scheme consists of a series of ex-
ante regulations149 controlling actions of member institutions but requires little 
in the way of proactive reporting requirements.150  The NCAA manual simply 
states that it is the responsibility of the institution to “monitor its programs to 
assure compliance and to identify and report to the Association instances in 
which compliance has not been achieved.  In any such instance, the institution 
shall cooperate fully with the Association and shall take appropriate corrective 
actions.”151  The regime also consists of a series of guidelines dictating the 
process for ex-post investigations of potential violations by NCAA 
investigation committees.152  This is much the same structure that the financial 
industry maintained prior to 2008.153  Instead, the NCAA’s modified versions 
of sections 712 and 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act should force internal 
compliance officers of member institutions and conferences to discuss 
recruiting, agent interaction, and booster interaction with the ultimate 
 
146.  See Coaches’ Pay Soars Again, supra note 109; You Have to Pay to Play in March, supra 
note 109; Upton & Berkowitz, supra note 109. 
147.  Michael Rosenberg, Nike’s Phil Knight has Branded Oregon into National Power, SI.COM 
(Jan. 7, 2011) http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/michael_rosenberg/01/06/oregon.knight/ 
index.html (describing Phil Knight’s access and influence over the Oregon athletic program).  Phil 
Knight has his own headset in his suite on game day at Oregon’s stadium so he can listen to the 
dialogue between coaches during the game.  Id. 
148.  Michael A. Corgan, Comment, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept Endorsement Deals: 
A Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics Created by Unethical Sports Agents and 
the NCAA’s Revenue Generating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 396–400 (2012). 
149.  See generally NCAA BYLAWS (2011–12).  The compliance rules are almost entirely of ex-
ante prohibitions, rather than constructive compliance and reporting mechanisms. 
150.  See id. § 2.8.1.  
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. §§ 32.1–32.11. 
153.  See Kwak, supra note 39.  A series of self-reporting regulations and ex-post investigations 
does little to prevent a systemic crisis. 
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governing body, the NCAA (or, per the analogy, the prudential regulators).154  
Such a requirement would help solve the common knowledge problem.  The 
NCAA would effectively become the prudential regulator to the ecosystem.  If 
there are ex-ante reporting requirements, not just prohibitions, the NCAA as 
prudential regulators can identify trends towards homogeneity in the form of 
rules violations, which pose a systemic risk to the NCAA.  Because the risks 
will be identified by an independent agent (the NCAA instead of each 
individual institution), the regime also solves the collective action problem 
whereby member institutions continue behaving in a way that maximizes their 
profits but exposes their entire system to systemic risk. 
As noted above, the current dialog between the NCAA and its member 
institutions occurs largely after a member institution discovers a violation 
because the NCAA manual demands self-reporting of violations.155  The clear 
problem with this self-reporting mechanism, however, is that the violation has 
already occurred.  A constant dialogue between the NCAA and its member 
institutions regarding recruiting visits from prospective players, booster 
interaction, and any questionably permissible benefits given to student-athletes 
would allow the NCAA to address potential violations by processing the 
information it receives before the violation occurs.  In turn, the NCAA can 
work with the member institution to act in a swift, preventative manner to 
either avoid the impermissible conduct or to take mitigating action to limit 
potential penalties. 
Critics will argue that the market should dictate the level of amateurism in 
the NCAA,156 and if players are able to command pay from the boosters, 
coaches, or agents that recruit them, the NCAA should not treat it as a 
violation, nor implement a new scheme to try to remedy the issue, nor even be 
concerned about any violation that is not illegal outside of the context of the 
NCAA.157  Rather, critics argue, the NCAA should allow college sports to turn 
into pure business.158  As discussed above, however, complete deregulation 
and a lack of monitoring of the NCAA would effectively eliminate athletic 
 
154.  Many NCAA violations arise as a result of impermissible benefits provided to student-
athletes by boosters or agents.  Others arise as coaches violate contact and communication rules with 
recruits as they try to attract the best talent possible to their programs. 
155.  NCAA BYLAWS § 2.8.1–2.8.3. 
156.  Andy Schwarz, Excuses, Not Reasons: 13 Myths about (Not) Paying College Athletes, 
SELECTED PROC. SANTA CLARA SPORTS L. SYMP. 46, 47 (Sept. 2011). 
157.  See Bartz & Sloey, supra note 13, at 2. 
158.  Id.  Note, however, that a pure business is not viable in any sports league.  Even the NBA 
and NFL have salary caps and anti-tampering rules that promote some kind of order and preserve the 
leagues product.  Id. at 6. 
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programs at all but the most profitable institutions.159  Schools with large, 
profitable athletic programs would no longer agree to revenue sharing plans 
because the assets they share with smaller institutions can now be used in an 
attempt to recruit the most sought after players.160  As a result, non-revenue 
generating sports and many women’s sports would be eliminated from 
member institutions.161  The end result of not policing NCAA violations 
would be an elimination of all but the very best football and basketball 
programs.162 
In order to effectively implement the above regime and prevent the de-
amateurization of college sports, however, the NCAA also needs to reform its 
idea of compliance coordinators at member institutions.  Currently, most 
NCAA compliance directors and assistant directors hold degrees in Sports 
Management or a related business field.163  Many compliance directors are not 
practicing lawyers.164  However, a “compliance director in a major program is 
an educator, arbitrator, mediator, advocate, enforcer, and not infrequently, the 
fall-guy.”165  Why, then, are compliance directors not required to be educated 
as such?  A compliance director’s main contribution to his or her employer is 
developing a system for investigating and reporting NCAA infractions.166  In 
order to adequately do so, however, the compliance director needs to have 
read, interpreted, and understood the 439-page NCAA rulebook.  The rulebook 
reads much like a state or federal law, and as one Texas basketball coach 
noted, “You’ve got to be a lawyer at the top of your class [to understand the 
NCAA rules].”167  Putting the right people in the right places (simply 
executing on a fundamental business principle) will help ensure that the 
NCAA creates meaningful, bottom-up reform in its corporate governance. 
 
 
159.  See id. at 24. 
160.  See id. 
161.  See id. at 26–29. 
162.  Id. at 29. 
163.  Megan Fuller, Note, Where’s the Penalty Flag: The Unauthorized Practice of Law, the 
NCAA, and Athletic Compliance Directors, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 495, 516 (2009–2010). 
164.  See id. 
165.  Gene Marsh & Marie Robbins, Weighing the Interests of the Institution, the Membership 
and Institutional Representatives in an NCAA Investigation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 667, 695 (2003) (noting 
that “[g]iven the infusion of millions of dollars into major college athletics, the resultant pressure to 
win and the never-ending quest of purportedly well-meaning individuals to get into the inner circle of 
the department, a compliance director has the most difficult job in college athletics”). 
166.  Id. at 697. 
167.  Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time for a New Game 
Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487, 509 (1995). 
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D.  How More Independent Directors on the NCAA’s Infractions Committee 
Will Lead to More Consistent, Workable Results 
Section 932(t) of the Dodd-Frank Act mandates that nationally recognized 
statistical rating agencies have a board of directors.  The board shall consist of 
at least two members, and at least half of those members shall be independent 
from the rating agency.168  The act specifically defines that in order to be 
considered independent, the director may not, other than in his or her capacity 
as director, “accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from 
the nationally recognized statistical rating organization; or be a person 
associated with the nationally recognized statistical rating organization or with 
any affiliated company thereof . . . .”169  Where a director violates one of the 
above requirements, he or she will be “disqualified from any deliberation 
involving a specific rating in which the independent board member has a 
financial interest in the outcome of the rating.”170  Furthermore, compensation 
for the board of directors must not be “linked to the business performance of 
the nationally recognized statistical rating organization, and shall be arranged 
so as to ensure the independence of their judgment.”171 
The goal in forcing credit agencies to contain independent directors is to 
remove any bias in decisions made by the rating agency that would result in 
financial gain to the directors, oftentimes at the expense of the investing 
public.  The NCAA can be viewed in the same light.  The passion involved in 
college athletics is unmatched elsewhere in sports, and the pressures for a non-
independent board member of the NCAA Committee on Infractions to levy 
penalties on a competitor, especially a rival, of his or her institution can be 
immense.  As one former NCAA infractions committee member noted, “For 
many people, happiness is the news that an NCAA enforcement representative 
is visiting another campus, most especially a competitor.”172 
The current rules governing the composition of the NCAA Committee on 
Infractions are as follows.  The committee is composed of ten members, seven 
of whom, curiously, “shall be at present or previously on the staff of an active 
member institution or member conference of the Association,” and at least two 
but no more than three of whom shall be members of the general public not 
affiliated with the association, its members, or representatives.173  
 
168.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932(t)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1882 (2010) 
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012)). 
169.  Id. § 932(t)(2)(B)(i). 
170.  Id. § 932(t)(2)(B)(ii). 
171.  Id. § 932(t)(2)(C). 
172.  Marsh & Robbins, supra note 165, at 682. 
173.  NCAA BYLAWS § 19.1.1 (2011–12) (emphasis added). 
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Additionally, there are two members elected as “coordinators of appeals.”174  
These members are responsible for processing appeals, being present at 
hearings (although they cannot actively participate in the hearings), being 
present and participating at committee deliberations, and representing the 
committee in the event a decision of the committee is appealed.175  Each 
member of the Committee on Infractions serves a three-year term and may be 
reelected two times.176  The purpose of the two coordinators of appeals is “to 
establish a separation between those who make the decision at the ‘trial court’ 
level, and those who defend the decision on appeal” from the member 
institution.177  Since two members must be designated coordinators of appeals, 
eight others are voting members, with as many as three and as few as two 
being public members.178  The current NCAA Committee on Infractions has 
three public members, all three of whom are attorneys, and seven non-public 
members.179 
As in the financial sector, there is a serious need to increase the number of 
independent members on the infractions committee.  This Article proposes that 
the NCAA follow Dodd-Frank’s footsteps and mandate that half of the ten 
members on the committee be independent members and four of them be 
voting members.  There is obvious value to having both non-public and public 
members on the infractions committee.  For related members, they likely have 
a deep understanding of the NCAA, as they attend committee meetings and 
conventions for a variety of NCAA issues and have daily, first-hand 
knowledge of the workings of the NCAA and their own institution.180  
However, those non-public members also, at the very least, are viewed as 
being biased towards their own institution during infractions hearings and, at 
most, act on that bias in favor of their own institution.181  Clearly, committee 
 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. § 19.1.1.4. 
176.  Id. § 19.1.1.3. 
177.  Gene A. Marsh, A Call for Dissent and Further Independence in the NCAA Infractions 
Process, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 695, 704 (2009). 
178.  NCAA BYLAWS § 19.1.1. 
179.  See Committee on Infractions, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public 
/NCAA/Enforcement/People/Committee+on+Infractions (last updated Oct. 25, 2011).  The current 
committee consists of one attorney from Polsinelli Shughart, Andres Kurth, and Foley & Lardner, and 
seven non-public members, one from the Southeastern Conference, Conference USA, and Mid-
Eastern Athletic Conference, and one from Temple, Missouri, Oregon, and Notre Dame, respectively.  
Id. 
180.  Marsh, supra note 172, at 705. 
181.  There is also a risk that these members have an axe to grind against the NCAA or a fellow 
institution.  The presence of multiple non-public members on the committee creates a collective 
action problem and disincentivizes NCAA members from reporting violations of other schools. 
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members hailing from certain institutions or conferences would not fall into 
section 932’s definition of “independent.”182 
By the same token, the ability to attract highly qualified lawyers and 
judges as public committee members almost necessitates an increase in the 
number of public members.183 One former committee member and law 
professor noted: 
The former and current public members who deliberate on 
cases came to us with judicial experience, either in state or 
federal court.  What they bring to the process is years of 
judicial experience, seasoned by all the experience such 
service brings.  At the same time, they are not card-carrying 
members of the NCAA.  It is the legal experience and the 
independence that makes them so valuable in the process. . . .  
Their questioning and skepticism—often bluntly stated—have 
helped us to get to more just results along the way.184 
Public members “bring to the process the same perspective, independence, and 
integrity that outside directors bring to corporate governance.”185  With such 
positive results and feedback for the role public members play on the 
committee, it is curious that the NCAA has not employed the minimum 
number of non-public members simply to adequately inform public members 
of relevant NCAA workings.  This would maintain a feeling of “credibility in 
the eyes of individuals who are judged and penalized in the process”186 but 
leave much of the actual decision making and voting processes to experienced, 
disinterested lawyers and judges. 
E.  How Increased Whistleblower Protections and Incentives Can Lead to 
Detection of More Violations and Less Severe Punishments for Those 
Violations 
The final recommendation of this Article to improve corporate governance 
in the NCAA is to add to its rulebook whistleblower protections beyond those 
already present in state and federal law.  The 439-page NCAA rulebook makes 
no mention of whistleblowers or protections for them.   Sections 748 and 922 
of the Dodd-Frank Act offer whistleblower protections and incentives in both 
 
182.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932(t)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1882 (2010) 
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012)). 
183.  Marsh, supra note 172, at 707. 
184.  Id. at 707–08. 
185.  Id. at 707. 
186.  Id. at 709. 
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a commodities setting and a securities setting.187  Both sections prohibit 
employer retaliation against employees who: 
(i) [P]rovide information to the SEC or the CFTC pursuant to 
these new programs; (ii) initiate, testify, or assist in an 
investigation or judicial or administrative action based on or 
related to such information; or (iii) make disclosures that are 
required or protected under [Sarbanes Oxley].188 
The Act also provides substantial reward incentives for whistleblowers.189  
The Act provides that the SEC shall pay an award to a whistleblower who 
“voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the 
successful enforcement of the covered . . . action.”190  The amount of the 
award will be between 10% and 30% of the total amount collected of the 
monetary sanctions imposed on the violating party.191 In determining the 
amount of the award, the SEC considers: 
(I) [T]he significance of the information provided by the 
whistleblower to the success of the covered judicial or 
administrative action; (II) the degree of assistance provided by 
the whistleblower and any legal representative of the 
whistleblower in a covered judicial or administrative action; 
[and] (III) the programmatic interest of the Commission in 
deterring violations of the Act . . . by making awards to 
whistleblowers who provide information that leads to the 
successful enforcement of such laws . . . .192 
Oftentimes, the first people to find out about a violation of NCAA rules 
are those within the violating institution’s organization.  The compliance 
director and others within the member institution are often in the best position 
to remedy or self-report a violation, although they seldom do so unless they 
are reasonably certain that self-reporting violations will lead to a less harsh 
penalty from the NCAA than if the violation is later discovered by the 
NCAA’s own investigation.  There are, however, two problems with 
attempting to apply the whistleblower protections to the NCAA.  First, the 
unique, team-oriented nature of sports puts whistleblowers at risk of being cast 
as outliers within their organization.  Second, whistleblowers in NCAA 
 
187.  §§ 748, 922. 
188.  Daniel J. Venditti, Whistleblower Protections Under the Dodd-Frank Act, WEIL 
EMPLOYER UPDATE 2 (Jan.–Feb. 2011). 
189.  Id. at 2–3. 
190.  § 748(b)(1). 
191.  § 748(b)(1)(A)–(B).  
192.  § 748(c)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(III). 
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violations have much less to gain monetarily than their financial counterparts, 
as many violations even deal with non-monetary items.  In order to effectively 
incentivize whistleblowers to come forward, the NCAA should assign dollar 
values to the duration and types of common violations, such that potential 
whistleblowers have some idea regarding the value of their tip should it lead to 
punishment of their institution. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The NCAA and its member institutions have experienced a meteoric rise 
in revenue and visibility over the past decade.  Accompanying that rise are 
problems of the rich getting richer, large scale recruiting violations, and the 
overall de-amateurization of college athletics.  Much like the financial 
industry, NCAA member institutions have sacrificed long-term gains in 
exchange for short-term profits.  The NCAA as a governing body, however, 
has not adjusted its enforcement mechanisms accordingly.  The above-
discussed regulations, as adopted from the Dodd-Frank Act, will help align 
incentives between the NCAA and its member institutions, reduce the number 
and severity of cheating incidents by players and coaches, and return the 
NCAA to the healthy forum for amateur competition that it desires. 
